Despite economic crunch, wealth of MPs, MLAs swells: ADR

New Delhi, Sep 25 (IANS) The average wealth of an MLA in India has swollen more than ten times from USD 1.3 million in the year 2015 to a massive Rs 13.6 million in 2018, founder of the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), Prof Jagdeep Chhokar said in New Delhi on Wednesday.

Professor Chhokar said that for an Indian MP, the average wealth in the year 2004 had stood at USD 280,639. However, the figure has grown to USD 2.9 million in the year 2019. Chhokar was replying to a query on the wealth of MPs and MLAs in India at a time when the country is going through a tough economic situation at a function held to commemorate 20 years of ADR, a non-governmental organisation that works in the field of electoral and political reforms in the country.

The function was held at the Foreign Correspondents Club of South Asia. As per ADR figures, the total wealth of all MPs in India stood at USD 144 million in the year 2004 and has now increased to USD 1.57 billion. Similarly, the combined wealth of all MLAs in the country that stood at USD 164.6 million in the year 2015 has now increased to USD 2.13 billion.

Replying to a query by IANS, Professor Chhokar said the organisation had been formed with the combined effort of 11 volunteers in the year 1999.

“These included eight IIM professors, two alumni of the IIM and one professor of the National Institute of Design. It was formed after we filed a PIL seeking implementation of the 170th Law Commission Report,” said Chhokar.

Elaborating on the journey of the ADR over the past 20 years, Professor Chhokar said that his PIL demanding implementation of a 2014 order of the Central Information Commission that political parties are public authorities and hence need to be covered under the ambit of RTI is still pending in the Supreme Court.

“The government of India has submitted a counter-affidavit to the PIL asserting that political parties should not be brought under the RTI ambit. Our case on electoral bonds is also pending in the Supreme Court,” he said.

The mandate upon candidates of all political parties to submit separate affidavits pertaining to their wealth and criminal background at the time of filing nominations for elections, considered to be one of the landmark steps in the electoral history of India, has been made possible largely due to the efforts of ADR.

“If we look at the countries bordering India, democracy is nowhere as successful as in our country. India is the only nation, from amongst all countries that got freedom from colonial rule in the 40s and 50s, to have an uninterrupted run of democracy. Also, for the past 20 years ADR has continued to exist, despite vehemently criticising all political parties, which is a tribute to the democratic traditions of India,” said Chhokar.

This article was originally published on Outlook India: The News Scroll

The Centre’s disregard for procedure and recommendation when it comes to Justice A.A. Kureshi is mysterious and telling.

Consider the following sequence of events:

In 1983, a  young man – let’s call him Y.M. – gets an LL.B. degree and starts practicing as an advocate in the high court of state ABC.

In March 2004, he is appointed as an additional judge in the high court of A.B.C.

In 2005, Y.M. is confirmed as a permanent judge of the high court of A.B.C.

In November 2018, the chief justice of the high court of A.B.C. is appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court of India with effect from November 01, 2018.

Being the senior-most judge of the high court of A.B.C, after the chief justice moved to the Supreme Court, Y.M. should have been appointed the acting chief justice of the high court of A.B.C, till a regular chief justice was appointed – which is the normal procedure and a long-standing tradition.

Instead, on October 29, 2018, the collegium recommends that Y.M. be transferred to the high court of D.E.F. The collegium order, however, also says that he will be transferred on or after November 15. This means he will remain in the high court of A.B.C. till November 14.

However, on November 01, 2018, the Union law ministry issues a notification saying Justice X.N., a judge of the high court of A.B.C, junior to Justice Y.M., would take over as acting chief justice of the high court of ABC. This despite the fact that the acting chief justice of a high court is, by convention, the most senior sitting judge of that court.

When the law ministry notification triggers protests among lawyers against the appointment of a junior judge as acting chief justice when a senior judge is still on the court, the ministry, on the morning of November 2, 2018, issues another notification ‘superseding the earlier notification’ and appoints Justice Y.M. as acting chief justice of the high court of A.B.C.

On November 15, 2018, Y.M. joins as a judge of the high court of DEF, where he becomes number three in seniority.

Now, on May 10, 2019, the collegium recommends the appointments of chief justices for four high courts.

One of the four judges is Justice Y.M., who is recommended for appointment as chief justice of the high court of K.L.M.

On May 22, 2019, one of the four recommended for appointment as chief justice of a high court, is duly appointed.

On June 08, 2019, a sitting judge of the high court of K.L.M. (for which Justice Y.M. was recommended for appointment as chief justice on May 10, 2019) is appointed as acting chief justice of the high court of K.L.M. with effect from June 10, 2019.

The “notification” issued by the government of India says that under “the powers conferred by Article 223 of the Constitution of India, the president is pleased to appoint Justice X.X.X, senior-most judge of the K.L.M. high court, to perform the duties of the office of chief justice of that high court with effect from June 10, 2019, consequent upon the retirement of Justice Y.Y.Y, chief justice, K.L.M. High Court”.

On June 19, 2019, two others who had been recommended for appointment as chief justices of high courts, are appointed as chief justices.

There is no action or information on the recommendation for appointment of Justice Y.M. as chief justice of K.L.M. high court.

On July 3, 2019, the Advocates Association of the high court of A.B.C. – Justice Y.M’s parent high court – files a public interest litigation (PIL) before the Supreme Court. It requests the court to direct the Union government to appoint Justice Y.M. as the K.L.M. court chief justice. Second, it prays for the court to establish that the Union must conduct the process of reviewing all future recommendations within six weeks.

On July 15, 2019, the first hearing of the PIL is held. The Supreme Court says, “A copy of the writ petition be served on the office of the learned Solicitor General of India, who will obtain necessary instructions in the matter. List the petition on 22.7.2019.”

Come July 22, 2019, the Supreme Court’s order said, “List the matter on 2.8.2019 to enable (the) learned Solicitor General of India to obtain necessary instructions.”

The government of India is, thus, given 11 days to decide the issue.

During the hearing, appearing for the lawyers’ body, senior advocate Fali S. Nariman requests to know how the Centre had gone about with the recommendation. He cites the Memorandum of Procedure (MoP) for appointment of a high court chief justice and says, “The Centre at best is a distinguished communicator. The MoP requires the Union law minister to obtain the views of the concerned state government.”

The MoP flows from Article 217 of the constitution, and empowers the Supreme Court collegium to recommend judges for the role of chief justice of a high court. The collegium comprises the Chief Justice of India and his or her two senior-most fellow Supreme Court justices. The collegium makes its recommendation to the Union law ministry, which obtains the concerned state government’s views and then submits a proposal to the prime minister. The Central government may request the collegium to reconsider its recommendation. However, if the collegium reiterates its recommendation, it becomes a binding obligation on the Central government to appoint the recommended judge.

The role of the law ministry is, thus, limited to obtaining the views of the concerned state government.

On August 2, 2019, the Supreme Court’s order says, “(The) learned Solicitor General submits that [the] decision of the appropriate authority of the government will be taken within a week of the closure of the ongoing parliamentary session. Matter be listed on 14.8.2019.”

On August 16, 2019, the Supreme Court’s order says, “(The) learned Solicitor General submits that the decision of the government on the recommendation of the collegium will be communicated to the collegium

“Matter be listed on such date that Hon’ble the Chief Justice on the administrative side may fix on receipt of report of the Registry.”

“Theits decision in the meantime, as stated by the learned Solicitor General.”

This is where the matter rests on the date of writing.

What does this mean?

I would prefer to leave it to the readers to make up their own mind about what is going on, after reading the above sequence of events but it is appropriate to reveal the identity of some of the dramatis personae involved.

And on this issue, I suppose disclosing just one name should be enough. “Y.M” is Akil Abdulhamid Kureshi. It is he who got an LL.B. degree in 1983, and started practicing as an advocate in the High Court of state A.B.C, meaning the Gujarat High Court. It was he who was prevented from becoming the chief justice, first of the Gujarat high court (by being transferred to the Bombay high court), and now, from becoming the chief justice of the Madhya Pradesh high court (the high court of K.L.M) through the process of sitting (apparently taking no action) on the recommendation of the collegium to appoint him as the chief justice.

Incidentally, the minutes of the meeting of the collegium held on October 29, 2018, say, “The collegium resolves to recommend that Mr. Justice A.A. Kureshi, Judge, Gujarat high court, be transferred, in the interest of better administration of justice, to Bombay high court” (italics added).

And just to complete the record, the minutes of the meeting of the collegium held on May 10, 2019, say,

“Office of the Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh high court would be falling vacant, very shortly, consequent upon retirement of Mr. Justice S.K. Seth, chief justice of that high court. Therefore, appointment to that office is required to be made.”

“Mr. Justice A.A. Kureshi is the senior-most Judge from Gujarat high court and at present is functioning, on transfer, in Bombay high court. Having regard to all relevant factors, the collegium is of the considered view that Mr. Justice A.A Kureshi is suitable in all respects for being appointed as chief justice of the Madhya Pradesh high court. The collegium resolves to recommend accordingly” (italics added).

Two facts stand out:

1. It has been over three months since the recommendation was made by the collegium on May 10, 2019, and there has been absolutely no news about why a decision about Justice Kureshi’s elevation to chief justice has not been taken.
2. The government of India has issued warrants of appointment for 18 judges to various high courts since May 10, 2019.

The key issue is why is there a delay in deciding the elevation of Justice Kureshi.

In the absence of any information from government of India about the actual or possible causes of delay, speculation, or rumours, hold the field.

The most prominent and oft-cited reason is also stated in the PIL filed by the Gujarat High Court Advocates Association (GHCAA) in the Supreme Court on July 3, 2019. The GHCAA has said in its PIL that Justice Kureshi’s appointment is being stalled due to political reasons. It gives two instances which, in its opinion, are the real causes of the delay:

(a) In 2010, Justice Kureshi had reversed a special CBI court’s order in th and remanded the present Union home minister Amit Shah in two days of police custody, and

(b) In 2012, Justice Kureshi had upheld Gujarat governor Kamala Beniwal’s (originally a Congress leais a concerned citizen and an advocate.

Sruthisagar Yamunan deserves to be complimented for his informative article that brings out a hidden dimension of the electoral bonds used to make anonymous donations to political parties in India.

Headlined “controversial electoral bonds are not only opaque, they come at a cost to the Indian taxpayer, the article asserts that there’s an invisible cost to the scheme. Every time an electoral bond is bought from the State Bank of India, it charges a commission that is paid by the government of India – or, in effect, by the Indian taxpayer.

Towards the end, the article quotes me as saying that “since the [electoral bonds] scheme funnels donations, neither the donor nor the recipient can be expected to pay the commission”. The quote, though accurate, is attributed in a way that leaves the issue hanging, giving the reader a vague impression that I prefer the commission on electoral bonds to be paid by the government.

The issue is a bit more complex. Let me try to clarify it.

• Corporates and sundry donors were, until fairly recently, donating money to political parties in whatever way the parties and donors preferred.
• It was the government that decided that donations – above Rs 2,000 – to political parties must be made through electoral bonds. The ostensible purpose for this, the finance minister stated in his budget speech on February 01, 2017, was to introduce “transparency in electoral funding”.
• The government authorised the State Bank of India to sell electoral bonds.
• Combining the three facts above, it can be inferred that:

1. Neither the donors nor the political parties and the State Bank of India initiated the electoral bonds scheme. It was the government that mandated it. Of course, the government got the scheme passed through the Parliament, but more on that later.
2. Expecting the donor or the receiver to bear the transaction cost is unjustified since neither chose it. It was the government that forced the scheme on them.
3. The State Bank of India also did not choose the scheme but was forced into it by the government.
4. This means that since the government forced the three entities – donors, recipients and the bank – into the scheme, the government should bear the transaction costs.

The matter does not end here, though. A few issues remain.

Assuming that the government took this action in public interest, and given the fact that the State Bank of India is a public bank, it should not make profits on the scheme. Rather, it should only charge the expenditure it incurs in the scheme’s implementation. This is why, I had said that the State Bank should deduct the interest it earns on electoral bonds – from the time they are bought to the time they are deposited – from the expenses incurred on administrating the scheme. The balance should be claimed from whoever is determined to pay the transaction cost.

But who should bear the transaction costs?

1. One option is for the government to lay down – through legislation or executive fiat – that since the donor decided to spend their money, they should bear the transaction costs.
2. The second option is for the government to lay down – though a similar process – that since the beneficiary in the transaction is the receiver, the transaction costs should be borne by them. But seeing as the receivers in this case are political parties, the government is unlikely to do this.
3. The government could alternatively order the State Bank to bear the transaction costs.
4. Or it could bear these costs itself.

It is the fourth option that is at the root of the problem.

Government bearing the transaction costs means that, in effect, they will be borne by the people at large or the taxpayers. This simply means that the people of this country will bear the cost of political parties receiving donations. And if the people’s money is being used to give benefits to political parties, then shouldn’t those political parties be answerable or accountable to the people?

But the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has told the Supreme Court in an affidavit that political parties should not come under the purview of the Right to Information Act. This was a stand also adopted by at least six national political parties – Bharatiya Janata Party, Congress, Nationalist Congress Party, Bahujan Samaj Party, Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India (Marxist) – all of which blatantly ignored a decision of the full bench of the Central Information Commission in 2013.

If the political parties refuse to be accountable to the people, it is unjustified to use people’s money to pay for administering the electoral bonds scheme.

To top it all, the constitutionality of the electoral bond scheme itself has been questioned, an issue mentioned by Sruthisagar Yamunan in his July 27 article. The scheme was brought before the Parliament as part of what is called a “money bill” – which was not in keeping with the definition of money bill given in Article 110 of the Constitution – making it unconstitutional and illegal.

All of this raises the question whether the scheme was introduced in public interest, or for the interest of political parties and corporates. The Supreme Court recognised the importance of this question on April 13, when in an interim order it said, “All that we would like to state for the present is that the rival contentions give rise to weighty issues which have a tremendous bearing on the sanctity of the electoral process in the country.”

Given this sanctity of the electoral process and the weightiness of the issues, it might well be a contravention of the Supreme Court order to spend more money on the electoral bonds scheme.

The writer is a former director in-charge of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. He is among the founding members of the Association for Democratic Reforms.

This article was originally published on Scroll.in

The passage of the Right to Information (Amendment) Bill, 2019 by both houses of Parliament is a very significant event. It has implications for several critical areas of governance in the country. It can be interpreted in the following ways: It is (a) a struggle of power between the Executive and the Legislature, (b) dilution of peoples’ power over government, (c) move away from a democratic towards an authoritarian society, (d) a shift from the direction of ‘open’ government towards an opaque or confidential government or (e) the stranglehold of the political establishment (consisting of all political parties) over the affairs of the nation.

Technically, or in theory, what the amendment does is that the service conditions (tenure and salary) of all Information Commissioners (central as well as in the states) which were so far to be decided by Parliament will henceforth be decided by the government of the day, without any approval from the Parliament. What it does in reality, or in practice, is to bring Information Commissioners completely under the direct control of the government of the day.

The preamble to the RTI Act, 2005, states that the purpose of the act is to set out a “practical regime of right to information for citizens to secure access to information under control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority…”, and that “democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed.” Hence, the only raison d’être for the existence of Information Commissioners was to ensure that public (essentially, government) authorities make such information available to citizens which will help citizens to protect their fundamental rights and avail of public services which may be denied to them and to which they are legally entitled.

What the above long and complex sentence means in simple English is that Information Commissioners, by the very nature of their jobs, are required and expected to make decisions that are not to the liking of the government of the day. If the tenure and salary of Information Commissioners is dependent on the pleasure of the government, expecting them to make decisions that the government does not like, just cannot be expected. This is a straight-forward case of perverse incentives!

Passing of this amendment also highlights the insidious hypocrisy of political parties. It is worth noting that when the Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha, only nine MPs voted against it. And when it was put to vote in the Rajya Sabha, the combined opposition could garner only 95 votes for sending the Bill to a select committee, against 117 who opposed sending the Bill to a select committee. This is when the total strength of the ruling coalition is 112 out of a total of 240 members of the Rajya Sabha. Only 212 members were present in the House at the time of voting.

After the motion to send the Bill to a select committee was defeated, the Opposition seemed to give up entirely. Members of several opposition parties staged a ‘walkout’, and some others supported the ruling coalition.

The history of political parties being averse to the RTI law is almost as long as the life of the law. The first attempt to weaken it under the garb of strengthening it was made in 2006, just a year after it was passed, by the same ruling coalition that piloted it. That attempt, and two others made by the same ruling coalition, were vehemently opposed by the community of, what has come to be called, RTI activists, and therefore did not succeed.

The current ruling coalition tried the same trick in its first tenure but did not succeed. That it decided to do it now, with great determination, is now obvious.

Another proof of this aversion is the disdain with which the six national political parties have treated a full-bench decision of the Central Information Commission (CIC) for the last six years. It was on June 3, 2013 that a full-bench of the CIC declared six national political parties (BJP, Congress, NCP, BSP, CPI, CPM) to be ‘public authorities’ under the RTI Act, and ordered them to appoint Public Information Officers, as required under the RTI Act, and respond to requests for information made under the Act.

In blatant and arrogant display of disdain for the highest statutory authority in the country for the RTI Act, they refused to implement the decision of the CIC. When the CIC sent notices, including show-cause notices, to all the six parties asking them why they had not implemented the decision, all of them ignored the notices and did not respond at all. Some refused to accept the notices!

Finally, on March 16, 2015, the CIC, in frustration, wrote, “…the respondents (the six national political parties) are not in compliance with the Commission’s order of 03.06.2013 and the RTI Act. The respondents, as public authorities, have not implemented the directions contained in the Commission’s order and there is no evidence of any intention to do so….” Calling it an “unusual case of wilful non-compliance”, CIC said it “is bereft of the tools to get its orders complied with.” The issue is now in the Supreme Court.

With this kind of political dispensation, expecting the RTI to survive or to revive it, is a daring hope. It is now left to the civil society at large, and the community of RTI activists in particular to continue to struggle so that the power that the people have tasted over the last 14 years, is not lost forever.

(Jagdeep S Chhokar is a former Professor, Dean, and Director In-charge of IIM Ahmedabad. Views are personal)

This article was originally published in Deccan Herald

The stranglehold of political parties on the electoral and political system continues to increase with time. The anti-defection law, passed in 1985, formalised the control of political parties even on Parliament. Despite a large number of candidates on the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM), the candidates with a realistic chance of getting elected are two or three, having got tickets from major political parties. Effectively, the choice of a voter is constrained by the choices made by a set of political parties. To sum up, this is what makes it almost impossible for independents to get elected.

The first four elections to the Lok Sabha saw a reasonable number of independents getting elected: 37 in 1951; 42 in 1957; 28 in 1962; and 43 in 1967. After that it has gone down to single digits. Only five independent candidates were elected in 2004. The number went up to nine in 2009 but dropped again to a dismal three in 2014. The situation in the assemblies is not too different. During the last three assembly elections, as many as 23 of 29 states showed a declining trend in electing independent candidates. The trend in the remaining six is mixed.

What will the elimination of independents and domination by candidates of political parties lead to? Is it good for democracy? The response to these questions is, “It can be good for democracy, provided certain conditions are met.” These conditions were specified by the Law Commission of India in 1999 in their 170th report: “It must be said that if democracy and accountability constitute the core of our constitutional system, the same concepts must also apply to and bind the political parties which are integral to parliamentary democracy…A political party which does not respect democratic principles in its internal working cannot be expected to respect those principles in the governance of the country. It cannot be dictatorship internally and democratic in its functioning outside.”

How many of our parties are democratic in their internal functioning is for the reader to decide.

Why it is so difficult for independents to get elected? As the saying goes, “Money makes the mare go.” The key lies in political and electoral financing. There are two major strands to this argument.

First, while there is a limit on expenditure that an individual candidate can incur on her/his election, there is none on the amount that a political party can. This obviously puts independent candidates, who had no party to bankroll their election, at a huge disadvantage.

The second strand pertains to the collection of money and is two-pronged. First is tax exemption. The Income Tax Act 1961, and amended in 1978 with the addition of Section 13A, grants 100% exemption from income tax to political parties. It also clarifies that for the purposes of this section, ‘political party’ means a political party registered under the Representation of People Act. So, the tax exemption that a party’s candidate enjoys becomes indirectly unavailable to independent candidates.

The way politicians collect their fund is another aspect that puts the independents at disadvantage. Funding of political parties remains by and large a mysterious affair, but two recent decisions taken by governments are illustrative.

The independent candidates are not eligible to get money from electoral trusts. But, incidentally, the Delhi High Court has held both the BJP and the Congress guilty of accepting money from ‘foreign sources’, thus violating the Foreign Contributions (Regulation) Act (FCRA). Interestingly, the ruling NDA government has been trying to get both the parties, the BJP and Congress, off the hook by attempting to amend the FCRA repeatedly, which in essence exempts them from any liability for their retrospective fund collection. Their latest attempt was to amend a law that was dead for eight years.

In January, the NDA government notified ‘electoral bonds’, and just like electoral trusts, the electoral bond notification says, “Only the Political Parties registered under … the Representation of the People Act… shall be eligible to receive the Electoral Bonds.” It bypasses the independents as well.

There is more to electoral bonds. These were introduced in the budget speech by the finance minister, in a section titled “Transparency in Electoral Funding”. But on the same day, the finance minister told the media that these bonds will be bearer in character to keep the donor anonymous. The only thing such steps would result in is the lack of transparency. Independents will increasingly find it difficult to fight that battle.

Jagdeep S. Chhokar is a former professor, dean, and director In-charge of Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad; and a Founder-Member of Association for Democratic Reforms

The views are personal

By Maj. Gen. Anil Verma (Retd)

The results are in for Karnataka but the jury is out as to who will provide a stable government due to the hung verdict of the electorate. The next two weeks will be full of political action and drama with the Governor, Opposition, BJP and the Supreme Court playing pivotal roles. While we wait for the dust to settle around the Vidhana Soudha, let’s have a look at the background of the Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) the Karnataka electorate has selected.

Karnataka Election Watch and the Association for Democratic Reforms have analysed the self-sworn affidavits of 221 out of 222 newly elected MLAs in the elections. The report states that the average assets per MLA in Karnataka have gone up three times over a decade. Almost all MLAs elected have assets more than a crore with 99% of Congress MLAs, 98% of BJP MLAs and 95% of JD(S) MLAs.

Financial background of your elected leaders

As per the ADR analysis, in the newly elected assembly, the average assets for each MLA is around Rs. 34.59 crore. In 2013, the average assets of 218 MLAs analysed were Rs. 23.54 crore, while in 2008 it was Rs. 10.05 crore. The average assets of re-elected MLAs have grown by a whopping 90%. The percentage of MLAs who reported assets of more than a crore have increased from 93% in 2013 to 97% this year.

When analysing the party-wise breakdown, Congress tops the charts with 11 (14%) out of the elected 78 MLAs with declared assets of more than Rs. 100 crore. While JD (S) has 3 (8%) out of their elected 37 MLAs and BJP has only one out of 103 MLAs whose assets are valued at more than Rs 100 crore. While 50% of the MLAs have assets over Rs. 10 crore, 22% have between Rs 5-10 crore, while 26% are between Rs 1-5 crore. This is an indication of money playing a powerful role and wreaking havoc in electoral system and needless to say, this is not the kind of democracy we want.

Criminal background of your elected leaders

The number of elected MLAs with pending criminal cases against them has increased. Out of the 221 MLAs analysed, 77 (35%) MLAs have declared criminal cases against themselves. In 2013, out of 218 MLAs analysed 74 (34%) had declared criminal cases against themselves. This year, 54 (24%) MLAs have declared serious criminal cases including cases related to attempt to murder, kidnapping amongst others. In 2013, 39 (17%) MLAs had declared serious criminal cases against themselves while four MLAs declared cases related to attempt to murder (IPC Section 307).

Looking at the party-wise breakdown, 42 (41%) out of 103 MLAs from BJP, 23 (30%) out of 78 MLAs from Congress and 11 (30%) out of 37 MLAs from JD(S) MLAs have declared criminal cases against themselves in their affidavits. 29 (28%) out of 103 MLAs from BJP, 17 (22%) out of 78 MLAs from INC and 8 (22%) out of 37 MLAs from JD(S) MLAs have declared serious criminal cases against themselves in their affidavits.

Election expenditure

As per media reports, it is estimated that Rs. 10,000 crore was spent by political parties and candidates towards election expenditure during the Karnataka 2018 elections. Compared to the figure of Rs 30,000 crores spent on the entire General Election in 2014, it is a very steep increase and a cause of concern. ADR and ECI have been recommending a cap on the political party expenditure akin to the expense limit of Rs. 40 lakhs and Rs. 70 lakhs for candidates contesting State Assembly and Parliament elections, respectively. However, none of the political parties and ruling governments have expressed interest in imposing a ceiling on party expenditure for election campaigns.

What did the electorate want?

Analysing the Karnataka election campaign and the results bring out the fact that despite the huge amount of money spent by the political parties, the electorate has signalled that it is unhappy with the INC and JD(S) and not entirely convinced that BJP deserves to form the government. The election campaign hit a new low with rhetoric and name-calling and seeking votes on caste/religion and other emotive issues.

The political parties missed the narrative of substantive issues facing the common man. During March 2018, ADR and Daksh along with Karnataka Election Watch conducted a survey in all 225 constituencies of Karnataka interviewing 13244 respondents. The aim of the survey was to ascertain the priorities of the voters and analyse their expectations from the newly elected government.

The results showed that Karnataka rural voters’ top five priorities included water supply and quality, better schools, roads, electricity supply and more hospitals. On the other hand the urban voter in Karnataka signalled their top five priorities were water supply and quality, better electricity supply, schools, roads and environmental protection.

The unfolding of the election campaign has made it clear that the political parties vying to gain governance did not address the needs of the common man. Their entire focus and the electoral arithmetic prior to/after the elections was to seek power – by means fair or foul. Parties are not interested in making serious efforts to generate employment, reduce agrarian distress, resolve the water issue, reduce inequalities and provide good governance to help raise the standard of living

On an annual Global Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), India remains classified among the “flawed democracies”. It has been continually slipping in the ranking from 27th place in 2014 to 32nd place in 2016 and to 42nd place in 2017.

What should be done?

The need of the hour is to revaluate the First Past The Post (FPTP) system because winners emerging under this system are not truly representative of the electorate’s choice. There are some MPs/MLAs who have won with as little as 20% vote share and there are political parties whose vote share is high but is not converted into equivalent number of seats.

Additionally, there needs to be a serious effort made towards bringing in political reforms to political parties and the ruling government. Although a parliamentary standing committee on Electoral reforms had been formed under the chairmanship of Anand Sharma, the committee has failed to do any substantial work. Institutions such as the Comptroller and Auditor General of India and the Election Commission of India need to be empowered so they can perform the tasks they were set up to do.

Lastly and most importantly, it is the people of India who have the capability to force the political parties to reform, by not voting them to power in case of their failure to perform. It is time “we the people” realise that we need to put an end to this charade, and clean up the system so that people with strong character and values who want to make change in the country enter the political field.

Maj. Gen. Anil Verma (Retd) is the head of the Association for Democratic Reforms and National Election Watch.

There was an intense debate around the introduction of electoral bonds by the government. Data obtained from SBI reveals that there is hardly any demand for electoral bonds of smaller denomination while 99.9% of bonds sold in terms of amount are of Rs 10 lakh & Rs 1 crore denomination.

The Electoral Bonds were first announced in the 2017-18 budget and the scheme was subsequently notified in January 2018. Factly had earlier written about the bonds, their impact on transparency etc.

Data obtained from the State Bank of India (SBI), the authorized bank to issue electoral bonds, suggests that electoral bonds of lower denominations like Rs 1000, Rs 10,000 and Rs 1,00,000 are not in much demand. Close to 97% of all the bonds purchased so far are in denomination of Rs 10,00,000 and Rs 1 crore.

Not a single bond purchased in 6 cities/branches
The scheme was open for 9 days each in March and April. In March, it was open only in four (4) branches across the country (Chennai, Kolkata, Mumbai & New Delhi). In April, the scheme was extended to seven (7) other branches taking the total number of branches to eleven (11). The seven other branches were Bangalore, Gandhinagar, Chandigarh, Bhopal, Jaipur, Lucknow & Jaipur. During the first phase in March, bonds were bought in each of the 4 branches. On the other hand, in April, the bonds were bought only in 5 branches out of the 11 (Chennai, Kolkata, Mumbai, New Delhi & Bangalore). Not a single bond was bought in other six branches during April.

72% of the total bonds (in amount) purchased from Mumbai & Kolkata
A total of 520 bonds of Rs 222 crore in value were sold in March, whereas in April, only 256 bonds of Rs 114.9 crore in value were sold. On the whole, 776 bonds of Rs 336.9 crore in value were sold in the two months of March & April. In terms of the bonds sold, Kolkata lead the way with 344 followed by 237 in Mumbai. In New Delhi, 76 bonds were sold whereas in Chennai, 62 bonds were sold.

In terms of the amount, bonds worth Rs 173 crore were sold in Mumbai followed by Rs 70 crore in Kolkata. New Delhi accounted for Rs 63 crore of the bonds sold while Chennai accounted for Rs 18 crore. Bonds worth Rs 12.9 crore were sold in Bangalore branch, which was included only in April.

Mumbai accounted for more than 50% of the bonds sold (in terms of amount). Together with Kolkata, it accounted for more than 72% of the bonds sold in terms of amount and close to 75% of the total number of bonds sold.

99.9% of bonds sold (in terms of amount) were in denomination of Rs 10 lakh & Rs 1 crore
The data reveals that the bonds of lower denomination are hardly in demand, an indication that citizens may not be buying them. Together, the denominations of Rs 1000, Rs 10000 and Rs Lakh bonds accounted for only 3.5% of all the bonds sold during this period while the remaining 96.5% of the bonds sold were of Rs 10 lakh & Rs 1 crore denomination. It is highly likely that the Rs 10 lakh & Rs 1 crore denomination are bought by corporates than individuals. In terms of amount, 99.97% of the bonds sold were of Rs 10 lakh & Rs 1 crore denomination. Only 17 bonds of Rs 1000 denomination and 10 bonds of Rs 1 lakh denomination were sold during this period. Not a single bond of Rs 10000 denomination was sold.